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The study of Australia’s Asian engagement — just as much as the history of the process itself 
— has been shaped by structural shifts in the international system and the global political 
economy as they reverberate through domestic political debates. As a consequence, ideas about 
Asian engagement tell us as much about the character of national political debates as they do 
about Australian policy-makers’ perceptions of the region. Understandings of Asia as a 
transnational political space are shaped by national conflicts and struggles over issues such as 
communism or national identity. Ideas and disputes over Australia’s relationship with Asia 
become closely aligned with conflict between conservative and radical academic approaches to 
Asia. With the end of the Cold War in the 1980s and 1990s, the triumph of neoliberalism and 
the waning of ideological politics of the 1960s were mirrored in academic approaches that 




Understandings of “Asian Engagement” — or ideas about, and policies toward, what 
we now think of as East Asia — hold up a mirror to the central conflicts, issues and 
struggles that have shaped political life in Australia. The study of Asian engagement — 
just as much as the history of the process itself — has been shaped by structural shifts 
in  the  international  system  and  the  global  political  economy  as  they  reverberate 
through domestic political debates. As a consequence, ideas about Asian engagement 
tell us as much about the character of national political debates as they do about 
Australian policy-makers’ perceptions of the region. 
We identify four key periods that have shaped ideas about Asian engagement in the 
academic literature on Asian politics and international relations. Constraints of space 
make this review somewhat arbitrary and artificial, but for our purposes we treat the 
period between Federation and the Cold War as a single entity, initially dominated by 
imperial relations and the search for political identity within a common order shaped 
by Britain. This period then gave way to a time when the study of Asia was dominated 
by the imperatives of the Cold War and the strategic priorities of Australia’s new 
“great and powerful friend”, the United States. 
It is a measure of just how much had changed in both Australia itself and within the 
wider East Asian region, that our third period is marked by an unambiguous and 
unapologetic “turn to Asia” signalled by what came to be known as policies of Asian 
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Engagement. Or so it seemed. In reality, the process and the very nature of Asian 
engagement were  surprisingly  fluid  and  uncertain, and  the  Howard  government’s 
tenure marked another significant recalibration of Australia’s foreign policy priorities. 
Indeed,  Australia-Asia relations  during  the  late  1990s  were  marked  by  a  distinct 
cooling in enthusiasm for “Asia”, and a renewed interest in reviving older strategic ties 
with the US. The importance of the relationship with the US and the continuing 
significance of strategic issues was highlighted and driven by the response to the events 
of September 11. This shift marks the start of our fourth period, which initially saw a 
renewed preoccupation with geopolitics, and subsequently came once again to be 
dominated by economic issues in general and the “rise of China” in particular. 
Although our periodisation is arbitrary, it helps us to make sense of the scholarship 
that has emerged around the politics of Asian engagement. One of the themes that 
emerges when seen in a longer historical sweep is that domestic discourses about 
“Asia” have reflected a shifting external order over which Australian policy-makers 
have had little control. Our approach to the intellectual history of debates over the 
engagement with the Asian region is that these debates have been essential to 
constituting notions of nationhood, statehood and citizenship. In this way we argue that 
debates over Asian engagement were refracted through domestic political debates over 
the nature of citizenship and political identity.2 
September 11 was a quintessential example of this: not only did these events 
profoundly affect Australia’s foreign relations, but they also generated a new set of 
national  and  international  debates  around  terrorism  and  national  security.  These 
debates were also reflected in the growth of an academic “security studies industry” 
that framed Asian engagement in terms of risk and threat rather than economic 
opportunity. Whatever we may think of the content of these analyses, they are in 
keeping with an established Australian tradition which has seen Australian policy- 
makers and academics alike largely adopting a reactive role that attempts to respond to, 
or make sense of, events and even ideas over which they have only marginal influence. 
Nevertheless, attempting to identify these ideas and the domestic institutions through 
which they have been mediated helps us to understand why relations between Australia 
and the region of which it is geographically — if not always geopolitically — such an 
important part, have been so contentious and susceptible to political and ideational 
change. 
 
Political Identity between the Empire and the Pacific 
The term “Asian engagement” came to prominence in the 1980s as a consequence of 
the determined diplomatic initiatives of the Bob Hawke and Paul Keating period. 
However, intellectual ideas behind what became known as “Asian engagement” have a 
longer history. David Walker’s work highlights the deep-seated cultural and political 
anxieties created by what was seen as the fundamental dilemma of a settler society 
with a European history in a culturally hostile neighbourhood.3 In a related vein, 
Rawdon Dalrymple argues that the sense of vulnerability was the cornerstone of the 
Australian foreign policy towards Asia.4 
 
2 For an elaboration of this approach see Kanishka Jayasuriya, “From British Subjects to Australian 
Values: A Citizenship Building Approach to Australia-Asia Relations”, Contemporary Politics, Vol. 
14, 4 (2008), pp. 479–495. 
3 David Walker, Anxious Nation: Australia and the Rise of Asia 1850-1939 (St Lucia, 1999). 
4 Rawdon Dalrymple, Continental Drift: Australia’s Search for Regional Identity (London, 2003). 
 
 
Between the First World War and the Second World War, the study of Australia’s 
foreign relations reflected the tensions and contradictions of a settler state coming to 
terms with its position as a remote outpost of empire. Consequently, we initially focus 
on a group of public intellectuals and academics who attempted to chart a more 
independent policy within the context of an imperial order. The study of Asia in this 
pre-war period reflected a search for constitutional and political identity — an identity 
that was to help forge a conception of sovereignty and statehood, in the context of the 
Empire. On this view, engagement with what is now know as the Asia Pacific is 
centrally concerned with issues of political and national identity.5 
Yet, as Neville Meaney points out,6  there were important intellectual and political 
variants in this search for an independent and distinctive political identity rooted within 
the common racial and cultural order of the British Empire. These views range across 
notions of imperial federation, relative independence within the Empire, and nationalist 
ideas. Especially important in this regard are those liberal imperialists such as the 
historian Keith Hancock who articulated a view of the Empire as a political association 
of dominions with a relative degree of autonomy.7 This political association was based 
on  cooperation  organised  around  respect  for  “shared  ideals”  that  presupposed  a 
common   racial   and   cultural   consciousness.   In   Hancock’s   view,   the   political 
constitution of the Empire in terms of shared ideals and norms — which bear striking 
similarity to  Hedley Bull’s conception of  international society8   —  provided for  a 
degree of relative autonomy in national and foreign affairs. 
Contending views of Australian’s involvement in Asia—or really in the Pacific— 
were a touchstone for a wider debate on political identity within the British Empire. 
The ideas of “liberal imperialists” laid the foundation for a nascent understanding of 
Australia as a middle power between London and Asia. These views found a hospitable 
reception within the Institute of Pacific Relations (IPR) based in the United States, with 
branches  in  New  South  Wales  and  Victoria.  The  IPR  grew  out  of  the  general 
intellectual climate of liberal internationalism at the end of the First World War. The 
institutes were devoted to “defining ‘fundamental and  universal’ Christian values, 
which might be made a common basis of ‘understanding and motivation for Pacific 
Peoples’”.9  It was a transnational intellectual network that fostered interest and 
engagement with the Pacific in a way that chimed with the growing military and 
economic power of the United States. A notable example of the work of the IPR was 
the study by Jack Shepherd — an Australian based at the IPR in New York — entitled 
Australian Interests in the Far East published in 1939.10 In some ways this remarkable 
 
5  A excellent account of the intellectual history of international relations in the pre-Second World 
War period and the role of the Australian Institute of International affairs is to be found in James 
Cotton, “Celebrating 75 Years: The Australian Institute of International Affairs and the Australia in 
the region”, Australian Journal of International Affairs, Vol. 62, 4 (2008), pp. 541-557. 
6  Neville Meaney, “In history’s page: Identity and Myth” in Deryck Schreuder and Stuart Ward 
Australia’s Empire (Oxford, 2008), pp. 363-387. 
7 Keith Hancock, Australia (London, 1930). 
8 Hedley Bull The Anarchical Society (New York, 1977). 
9 Nicholas Brown, “Australian intellectuals and the image of Asia 1920-1960: Australian perceptions 
of Asia”, Australian Cultural History, Vol. 9 (1990), pp. 80-92. 
10 Jack Shepherd, Australian Interests in the Far East (New York, 1939). Shepherd’s work followed 
in the wake of the John Crawford (1938) analysis of Australia’s role in Pacific. He argued that 
industrial expansion of Japan required an Australian commitment to collective regional security. In 
the post-war period Crawford was secretary of the Department of Trade and key architect of a pivotal 
 
 
work foreshadowed the Garnaut Report of the 1980s in highlighting Australia’s 
emerging role as a Pacific power in a culturally distinctive East Asian region with 
growing developmental potential. Like many other IPR studies, it sought to understand 
development and international relations through newly emerging social science 
techniques. The work of those such as Shepherd reflected an attempt to understand 
economic development in non-European contexts which in some ways anticipated 
modernisation theories of the 1950s and 1960s albeit without the Cold War backdrop. 
These early studies sought to understand economic development as an experiment in 
how “to secure cultural integrity while also engineering economic modernity”.11 Hence 
the Asia Pacific provided some clear lesson for Australia’s own political and economic 
development. 
A pivotal figure in this liberal milieu was Frederick Eggleston. He was perhaps the 
most prominent public intellectual of the interwar period. He was a Deakinite liberal, 
Victorian Cabinet Minister, adviser to Billy Hughes at the Paris Peace Conference, and 
Minister to China during the Second World War. He was also a key member of the 
IPR. In this capacity Eggleston visited Japan in 1929 and “he gained considerable 
respect for Japanese culture and for the manner in which the country had transformed 
itself from a medieval to a modern society”.12 The interwar years convinced him that 
Australia needed to be a Pacific power — to maintain alliance with the US but also 
become more engaged in the Pacific.13 Nevertheless, Eggleston remained committed to 
protecting Australia’s British identity that was the source not only of cultural identity 
but also of its political institutions. For Eggelston as well as for other participants in the 
IPR network, Pacific engagement was always framed in the context of maintaining 
Australia’s distinctive political identity. In fact, it was not so much a search for Asian 
engagement, but more a desire to create a distinctive role for Australia in the region 
while remaining tied to its imperial mooring. 
Pacific engagement was also a theme that was of crucial importance to the more 
British-oriented Australian Institute of International Affairs (AIIA) associated with a 
group of Melbourne intellectuals. Prominent members of the Institute included 
Eggleston, John Latham, Robert Garran and Edmund Piesse and, like the IPR, the AIIA 
was a product of the Paris Peace conference and Wilsonian liberalism. In fact there was 
considerable institutional overlap between the IPR and the AIIA.14  More importantly, 
both institutions were located within a broadly liberal intellectual milieu that combined 
the Wilsonian strand of liberal internationalism of the interwar period with the liberal 
imperial tradition represented by individuals such as Hancock and Eggleston. Like the 
IPR, the AILA which published the Austral-Asiatic Bulletin, sought to grapple with the 





trade agreement with China. In 1960 he became Director of the Research School of Pacific Studies 
and later became Vice-Chancellor of the Australian National University. J.G. Crawford, “Australia as a 
Pacific Power” in Walter George Keith Duncan, ed., Australia’s Foreign Policy (Sydney, 1938). 
This book was published in collaboration with the Australian Institute of International Affairs. 
11 Brown, “Australian intellectuals and the image of Asia 1920-1960”, p. 81. 
12 Meaney, “In history’s page”, p. 367 
13  Warren Osmond, Frederic Eggleston: An Intellectual in Australian Politics (Sydney, 1985), see 
especially pp. 137-45. 
14 See Cotton, “Celebrating 75 Years”. 
 
 
modernity.15    The  Austral-Asiatic  Bulletin  was  determined  to  advocate  a  more 
regionally  centred  economic  and  foreign  policy  and  the  group  were  especially 
interested in developing a knowledge and expertise of “Asian affairs”. In comparison 
with the IPR, this group adopted a more philosophical approach to issues of Pacific 
engagement.16 
A leading intellectual in this group was William Macmahon Ball, Professor and 
Head of the Political Science department at Melbourne University. He was the first of 
the Labor Party intellectuals on foreign affairs, and an active contributor to public 
debate through newspaper columns and on the Australian Broadcasting Commission 
(ABC), director of short-wave broadcasting during the war, and Commonwealth 
member  of  the  Allied  council  for  occupied  Japan.17   In  the  latter  role  he  was 
instrumental in proposing the far-reaching land reform program in occupied Japan that 
won the support of General Macarthur. He was close to Eggleston and was similarly 
active in the IPR and the Victorian division of the Australian Institute of International 
Affairs.18 However his sympathies were with the Labor Party and he had a close though 
difficult relationship with Herbert Evatt during and after the Second World War. 
Ball differed from other members of the IPR in that his contribution to international 
relations straddled the period between the intellectual flirtation with ideas of Pacific 
engagement with the region in the pre-war period, and the rise of Asian nationalism 
and the Cold War ideas of Asia that took root in the post-war period. He, as with most 
IPR members, desired a more independent Australia with a distinctive political identity 
that could actively engage with Pacific Asia. However, especially in the light of his 
post-war  experience,  Ball  had  a  deeper  understanding  of  the  social  forces  and 
ideologies shaping the post-colonial world. 
These ideas found expression in Ball’s report on his goodwill mission to East Asia 
where he noted that: 
 
[A] deep-rooted and passionate nationalism was the main political driving force in every country 
visited. The most striking expression of this nationalism was negative. It was a movement of 
resistance against (a) ‘political domination’, and (b) economic ‘exploitation’ by foreigners.19 
 
These ideas came to be more systematically developed in his book on Nationalism and 
Communism in Asia published under the auspices of the Institute of Pacific Relations.20 
He makes three broad points: firstly that nationalism is a dynamic force in much of 
post-war Asia and this deserves recognition in “western” foreign policy; secondly, the 
importance of socio-economic issues and conflicts in the process of national 
development; and finally that the study of Asian politics requires an emphasis on the 
driving desire of Asian countries to forge their own destinies against the “west” or the 
“east”. Here he picked the rising strength of ideas of non-alignment, neutrality, and 
 
 
15 Brown, “Australian intellectuals and the image of Asia 1920-1960”. This article is highly 
illuminating on the activities of the IPR and AIIA especially in relation to the association between 
developmentalism and culturalism. 
16 Walker, Anxious Nation, pp. 231-232. 
17 Alan Rix, W. Macmahon Ball: A Pioneer in Australian Asian Policy, Australians in Asia Series No 
3 (Nathan, Qld, 1988). 
18 Osmond, Frederic Eggleston. 
19  William Macmahon-Ball, “Goodwill Mission to East Asia”, Australian Department of Foreign 
Affairs. Historical Documents Project (June-October 1948). 
20 William MacMahon-Ball, Nationalism and Communism in East Asia (Melbourne, 1952). 
 
 
anti-colonialism, all of which were soon to be enshrined in the resolutions of the 
Bandung Conference. In making these points, Ball departed considerably from the 
culturalist notions of Asia that marked the work of members of the IPR and AIIA like 
Eggleston in the interwar period as well diverging sharply from the Cold War 
intellectual warriors who came to dominate the study of Asia in the 1950s and 1960s. 
In his sympathy for, and understanding of, local social forces and ideologies — though 
it needs to be understood that he did not use class concepts — his work was the natural 
precursor to the radical work of Herb Feith, Rex Mortimer, John Girling and Richard 
Robison. But unfortunately the path laid out by Ball was not followed by mainstream 
international relations scholars who genuflected to Cold War politics. 
 
Cold War Politics and Understandings of Asia 
Asian engagement in the Cold War period was influenced by three central factors: the 
alliance between the United States and Australia in the Korean and Vietnam Wars; the 
dominance of anti-communism in national political debate and concomitant paranoia 
about China, and the emerging anti-Vietnam war movement and its influence on the 
academic study of Asia. Ideas and disputes over Australia’s relationship with Asia 
become closely aligned with conflict between conservative and radical academic 
approaches to Asia. On the Right, Australia’s external relations were seen largely in 
geopolitical terms and the domestic authoritarianism that emerged in Asia was 
understood as a function of “modernization”. On the Left — which remained marginal 
within the academic and political establishment—external relations were understood in 
terms of the category of imperialism, and Asian political conflict in terms of radical 
nationalism and class politics. At the same time the ruling conservative coalition relied 
on Cold War politics and anti-communism to cement its hold on power. In this it relied 
heavily on the anti-communist and Catholic Democratic Labor Party, a breakaway 
from the Australian Labor Party. As this Cold War politics took shape, the study of 
Asian engagement became a proxy for domestic political debates and conflicts. 
Ball was one of the few writing in the Cold War period who viewed economic 
development as the key to securing Australia’s relationship to Asia. On the other hand, 
the mainstream academic community — like the Australian government — viewed 
stable security and military relationships with the United States as an indispensable 
element of Australia’s engagement with Asia. Richard Higgott and Jim George 
persuasively argue that Australian international relations scholarship sought to identify 
protectors and threats to Australian security. On this view ANZUS was understood to 
“be Australia’s bulwark against the ‘red’ and ‘yellow’ threats from the Soviet Union, 
China and the inevitable succession of falling dominoes in South-east Asia”.21 
Owen Harries well reflected this Cold War mindset when he argued that communist 
aggression and China could only be contained by support for American intervention in 
Asia.22  Harries later went on to become a key adviser to Andrew Peacock during the 
Fraser government, and produced in 1979 the influential report on the third world in 
the global order. After the election of the Labor government, Harries became editor of 
 
 
21  Richard Higgott and Jim George, “Tradition and change in the study of international relations in 
Australia”, International Political Science Review, Vol. 11, 4 (1990), p. 426. In a similar vein, see 
Michael Wesley and Tony Warren, “Wild colonial ploys? Currents of thought in Australian foreign 
policy”, Australian Journal of Political Science, Vol. 35, 1 (2000), pp. 9-26. 
22 Owen Harries, “Is Communism a Threat to Australia?” in John Wilkes, ed., Communism In Asia: A 
Threat to Australia? (Sydney, 1967). 
 
 
The National Interest — the home of American neo-conservatism. To be sure, the older 
culturalist understanding that shaped interwar interpretations of Asia and the Pacific 
did not disappear, but these understandings now became one dimension of the crusade 
against communism.23 
In the 1960s, international relations as an academic discipline became more 
professional and institutionalised. While institutions such as the AIIA continued to play 
an important role in shaping public policy and discussion over Asia, academic 
institutions came to play a prominent role in shaping interpretations of Asia. The pre- 
eminent academic institution was the Department of International Relations at the 
Australian National University. In its understanding of Asia it remained a bastion of 
the “realist school” of international relations. One of the consequences of realist 
dominance was that Australia’s relationship with Asia was primarily reflected through 
the prism of the global balance of power and the role of the United States in the region. 
There were some exceptions, such as the work of Gregory Clark on China. Curiously, 
Hedley Bull, who had a major influence on Australian international relations, had very 
little impact on the study of Asia.24 In fact if anything, the institutions like the IPR and 
AIIA in the interwar period, with their emphasis on shared values and norms, were 
more in line with what was later to be known as the English School. 
The attitudes of the international relations academy toward Asia became the 
battleground for Cold War politics. Three central issues continued to dominate the 
debates regarding Australia’s understanding of Asia: i) debates over the Vietnam war; 
ii) engagement with China, and iii) the response to the New Order regime in Indonesia 
that had brutally suppressed the Indonesian Communist party. This amounted to an 
academic Cold War that paralleled the politics played out on the national and 
international stage. 
One especially prominent figure in this academic Cold War was the economist 
Heinz  Arndt  who  founded  the  Indonesian  Economy  Project  at  the  ANU  and  the 
Bulletin of Indonesian Economic Studies.25 This journal proved to be highly influential 
in shaping the ideas of the economic technocrats advising Suharto’s New Order 
government. Arndt’s political commitments reveal that he was a “consistent supporter 
of the Cold War policies of the United States and Australia from the time of the 
Korean war up to and including Vietnam engagement, and he expressly subscribes 
to the ‘domino’ theory of communist expansionism”.26 His writing on Indonesia 
reflected a desire for economic modernisation combined with political order and 
stability as seen thorough the lens of the battle between the “West” and communism. 
On the other side of the academic Cold War, opposition to the Vietnam War 
generated interest in Marxist and radical approaches to understanding political and 
social change in Asia. Despite the many differences in approach, this critical work 
remained  within  the  spirit  of  Ball  rather  than  of  Arndt.  The  edited  volumes  on 
 
23  See for example along these lines Thomas B. Millar, Australia’s Foreign Policy (Sydney, 1968); 
J.D.B. (Bruce) Miller, “Communist China’s Foreign Policy” in John Wilkes, ed., Leninism and Asia 
(Sydney, 1967), and Harries, “Is Communism a Threat to Australia?”. All were leading Australian 
international relations scholars during this period. 
24 Bull supported the shift towards a more independent policy during the Whitlam Period. 
25 He was for a time a co-editor with Peter Coleman of the conservative journal Quadrant. 
26 Rex Mortimer, “From Ball to Arndt : The Liberal Impasse in Australian Scholarship on Southeast 
Asia” in Rex Mortimer, ed., Showcase State : the Illusion of Indonesia’s Accelerated Modernisation 
(Sydney, 1973), p. 124. 
 
 
Australian political economy by the political economists Ted Wheelwright and Ken 
Buckley  in  their  five  volumes  Essays  in  the  Political  Economy  of  Australian 
Capitalism sought to place Australia’s political and economic developments within the 
global  capitalist  order.  John  Girling,  working  against  the  grain  at  the  Australian 
National  University,  challenged  the  logic  of  the  domino  theory  of  communist 
expansion, and sought to develop a political economy explanation of US intervention 
in the third world.27 At the Department of Government at Sydney University, Rex 
Mortimer analysed Indonesian politics and the New Order regime from a dependency 
perspective.28 Herb Feith at Monash University founded the Centre for Southeast Asian 
Studies which formed the basis for much critical work on Southeast Asia. Monash 
provided an especially hospitable environment for anti-war protests and much of the 
new left inspired by interest in western Marxism. 
In the late 1960s and early 1970s there was a Prague spring of sorts on the campuses 
and within cultural institutions such as the ABC. For example, the ABC’s Alan Ashbolt 
— the first producer of “Four Corners” — played a pivotal role through the program 
“Lateline” in bringing radical and critical scholarship, including commentary and 
discussion about political conflicts in Asia, to a broad audience. But this was not a 
simple analysis of current affairs but an attempt to analyse the social and political 
transformation in Asia through Marxist or radical methods. The nature of this Prague 
spring is well summed by Ashbolt: 
 
I believed in fostering the growth of a national consciousness, but also that Australia had been too 
insular for too long. I believed [...] that the ABC’s ideological ties with powerful forces in political 
society and key institutions in civil society had been too close for too long.29 
 
It  needs  to  be  recognised that there were some academics such  as  the sinologist 
Stephen Fitzgerald who, while dissenting from the mainstream orthodoxy on China, 
were not part of the radical camp. Fitzgerald played in important role in shaping the 
Labor party’s view on China, culminating in then opposition leader Gough Whitlam’s 
landmark visit to China in 1971. Fitzgerald, in 1973, became Australia’s first 
Ambassador to China. While many of the academic debates during the Cold War were 
marred by personal acrimony and bitterness, this period also proved to be — perhaps 
because of the very personal bitterness — the most creative political debate and 
discussion on Australia’s engagement with Asia. These debates largely disappeared 
after the end of the Cold War. One exception, though, was the work of the Asia 
Research Centre at Murdoch University in the 1990s. Under the directorship of Richard 
Robison,30 the Centre made a significant contribution to the study of the political 
economy of Asia establishing a distinctive reputation for the analysis of the interaction 






27   John  Girling, America and  Third  World:  Revolution and  Intervention (London,  1980);  John 
Girling, “Vietnam and the Domino Theory”, Australian Outlook, Vol. 21, 1 (1967), pp. 61-70. 
28 Mortimer, “From Ball to Arndt”. 
29  Quoted in David Bowman, “The lion of the ABC”, Australian Policy Online, 15 June 2005. 
Available at:<http://www.apo.org.au/webboard/results.chtml?filename_num=12062> (17 June 2009). 
30 Robison was the author of major critical work on the political economy of Indonesia. See Richard 
Robison, Indonesia: The Rise of Capital (Sydney, 1986). He was a graduate student of Rex Mortimer. 
 
 
Robison’s graduate students, including Garry Rodan and Kevin Hewison, produced 
major works on the political economy of Singapore and Thailand.31 
 
The Politics of Markets 
With  the  ending  of  the  Cold  War,  economics  assumed  a  more  central  place  in 
Australian foreign policy. This was part of a more general shift from geo-politics to 
geo-economics, which saw even the United States redefine its “national interest” and 
its policy priorities.32  For Australia, the growing economic importance of the East 
Asian region meant that Australian policy-makers had little choice other than to try to 
establish good relations with their northern neighbours. At the core of this 
transformation was the remarkable industrialisation and economic expansion of much 
of East Asia beyond Japan, which rapidly morphed from strategic threat to economic 
Eldorado. The consequent foreign policies of the Hawke-Keating governments and the 
pursuit  of  “Asian  engagement”  during  the  1980s  and  early  1990s,  marked  an 
apparently decisive and irrevocable shift in both the terms of the domestic debate and 
the  way  in  which  the  region  itself  was  seen  by  Australian  policy-makers  and 
academics. 
These efforts were significantly influenced by the Garnaut Report which effectively 
provided a blueprint and rationale for closer economic ties with the region.33  While 
there has been a good deal of debate about both the Garnaut Report’s suggested mode 
of  engagement with,  and  of  the  Australian  foreign  policy  establishment’s 
understanding of, the developmental experience in Asia,34 there was and has been less 
disagreement about the idea that Asia is likely to prove a decisive influence on 
Australia’s economic future. The recent “rise of China” and the recent resource boom 
in Australia has only reinforced perceptions about the region’s economic importance 
and the necessity of maintaining good relations, however ideologically unpalatable this 
may be at times.35 
Much  of  the  domestic  debate  in  the  1980s  and  1990s  revolved  around  the 
appropriate role of government in driving this process. In this context, the Asian 
developmental experience became something of an academic Rorschach test: for those 
observers who thought that an activist “developmental” state had been a central 
component  of   the   region’s   remarkable,  historically-unprecedented,  and   largely 
 
 
31  Gary  Rodan, The  Political Economy  of  Singapore’s Industrialization (London, 1989); Kevin 
Hewison, Bankers and Bureaucrats: Capital and the Role of the State in Thailand (New Haven, 
1989). 
32  Mark Beeson and Richard Higgott, “Hegemony, Institutionalism and US Foreign Policy: theory 
and  practice in  comparative historical perspective”, Third  World  Quarterly, Vol.  26,  7  (2005), 
pp.1173-1188. 
33 Ross Garnaut, Australia and the Northeast Ascendancy (Canberra, 1990). 
34 Richard Leaver, “The Garnaut Report: The quality of realism”, Australian Journal of International 
Affairs, Vol. 44, 1 (1990), pp. 21-28; Trevor Matthews and John Ravenhill, “The neo-classical 
ascendancy: The Australian economic policy community and Northeast Asian growth” in Richard 
Robison, ed., Pathways to Asia: The Politics of Engagement (St Leonards, 1996), pp. 131-70; Dick 
Bryan and Michael Rafferty, “Still calling Australia home? International integration and the framing 
of national economic problems in recent official reports”, Australian Journal of International Affairs, 
Vol. 51, 1 (1997), pp. 5-20. 
35 See Jian Zhang, “Australia and China: Towards a strategic partnership?” in James Cotton and John 
Ravenhill, eds., Trading on Alliance Security: Australia in World Affairs 2001-2005 (Melbourne, 
2007), pp. 89-111. 
 
 
unexpected growth, not only were there potential lessons to be learned from this, but 
they might also have direct policy relevance in Australia. Some thought Australia 
might even benefit from developing Japanese-style industry policies to compensate for 
Australia’s comparatively lacklustre economic performance.36  At a minimum, others 
contended that Australian policy-makers needed at least to understand what the sort of 
policy regimes and strategies other regional economies were employing if they hoped 
to compete successfully.37 
The mainstream view, however — which was seen by some observers as a 
consequence of the dominance of “economic rationalism” at the top of Australia’s 
policy-making hierarchy38 — was one that advocated domestic reform and the bracing 
impact  of  market  forces  as  the  cure  for  Australia’s  economic  malaise.  As  a 
consequence, the “turn” toward Asia, which the Hawke-Keating governments largely 
initiated and drove, was one that was predicated on multilateral institutions at the 
political level and the unencumbered operation of market forces at the economic level. 
The centre-piece of this process was the Asia Pacific Economic Co-operation (APEC) 
forum, an institution that Australian policy-makers played a prominent part in bringing 
about,  and  which  reflected  the  influence  and  ideas  of  prominent  mainstream 
economists  like  Ross  Garnaut  and  his  colleague  at  the  ANU’s  Australia-Japan 
Research Centre, Peter Drysdale.39 
Like the Asian engagement process more generally, APEC has tended to generate 
wildly divergent responses that tell us as much about the ideological and normative 
predispositions of the authors as they do about the organisation itself. For the likes of 
Garnaut and Drysdale, APEC was seen as a mechanism with which East Asians might 
be convinced of the merits of free trade, neoliberalism and the sort of policy agenda 
that had figured so prominently in the “Anglo-American” economies since the 1980s.40 
For critics, however, APEC seemed at odds with historical reality and unlikely to win 
over sceptical Asian elites who were comfortable with — even proud of — the sort of 
state-led, neo-mercantilist developmental strategies that had been pioneered by Japan 
and emulated elsewhere across the region.41 
The fact that Australian commentators could come to such divergent views — not 
just about the best way of dealing with “Asia”, but the nature of the region’s 
developmental experience more generally — highlighted the politicised nature of the 
policy debate. On  the one  hand, ownership of  the  “engagement” process  became 
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increasingly contested as the importance of the region to Australia’s long-term future 
become clearer and the necessity of maintaining good relations became increasingly 
apparent.42    Some  of  the  institutions  and  ideas  that  had  underpinned  Labor’s 
engagement push were marginalised by a Liberal government that eschewed the “big 
picture” and concentrated on pragmatic bilateralism. 
At times, this led to some rather fanciful and implausible retrospective claims about 
the relative significance of key historical figures like Bob Menzies — a notorious 
Anglophile, and not normally noted for his enthusiastic embrace of Asia.43  In fact 
under the Howard administration, Foreign Minister Alexander Downer commissioned 
—– written by well-known and impartial academics — a history of Australian 
diplomatic engagement with Asia.44 There can be little doubt that the commissioning of 
this volume was a riposte to Labour’s perceived ownership of “Asian engagement”. 
But  even  less  partisan  and  polemical  observers  were  concerned  that  Australia’s 
relations with — indeed, the very understanding of — relations with Asia were 
compromised by a basic lack of “Asia literacy”.45 The egregious neglect of Asia studies 
and the under-investment in language skills in Australia over the last decade or so 
seemed to confirm some of these predictions,46 although this has clearly done little to 
inhibit the development of ever stronger economic links. 
Supporters of the Howard government’s policy toward the region pointed to the 
growth of economic interdependency as proof of the efficacy of the Coalition’s 
approach. While the Howard government’s policy towards Asia was punctuated by 
some spectacular and unnecessary own goals — the most notorious of which was the 
cringe-making “deputy sheriff” episode47 — generally, relations with Asia were better 
than some commentators had feared.48 In some ways, they could hardly have been 
otherwise: the overwhelming geographical and geophysical reality underpinning 
Australia’s relationship with the region was that its resources and supplies of energy 
meant that, no matter what Asians thought of Australia, its importance as a source of 
raw materials ensured that it could never be irrelevant to the strategic calculus of 
regional political elites.49 
What was most significant and innovative about the Howard government’s approach 
to  the  region  in  particular  and  to  foreign  policy  more  generally  was  a  marked 
preference for bilateral, rather multilateral relationships and a marked disdain for 
intergovernmental institutions like the United Nations (UN). Remarkably — and 
hypocritically — enough, Alexander Downer has taken up a position with the UN since 
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quitting politics,50  but while he was Australia’s Foreign Minister he oversaw a 
significant shift away from multilateralism. For some, the return to “realism” and the 
pragmatic pursuit of an apparently self-evident national interest was the key to more 
effective  relations  with  the  region  and  countries  that  were  seen  as  inherently 
problematic and prone to instability.51 And there was, indeed, some notable success for 
the Howard government during its incumbency: Australia’s rapid response to the 
disastrous tsunami in Indonesia did more to repair the fragile bilateral relationship than 
anything else it did during its time in office. As a consequence, there were important 
revisionist readings of the overall legacy of Howard and his government, which 
suggested that “the Howard government has not been the disaster for Australia’s 
regional relations that many expected”.52 
When seen in a longer time frame, however, what was most significant about the 
Howard government’s period in office was the deepening of relations with the United 
States, something that was driven by the Coalition’s ideological proclivities and the 
return of strategic imperatives to the top of the policy-making agenda. 
 
After 9/11 
Australian perspectives on its strategic relations with Asia have often been divergent, if 
not polarised, reflecting a variety of theoretical and normative assumptions. For more 
critically-minded observers, Australia’s security policies have always been shaped by a 
pervasive sense of insecurity in which “Asia” loomed-large: as we have seen, 
Australia’s predominantly Anglo-Celtic population had been a congenitally “anxious” 
nation as a consequence of its geographical location.53 Anthony Burke, one of the most 
thoughtful of a new generation of critical scholars working in Australia, argued that the 
very basis of security needed to be rethought if we were to understand the way that 
particular issues became “securitised” and the object of government policies. The 
Howard government’s treatment of asylum seekers and refugees became the locus 
classicus in this regard.54 
But despite the fact that a number of Australian scholars were beginning to make 
major contributions to unfolding international debates about the nature of security, the 
mainstream perspective remained fairly impervious to such innovations. For an older 
generation of scholars, “Asia” remained a potential source of threats and dangers, even 
if the discourse became somewhat more sophisticated and nuanced. What came to be 
described as the “arc of instability” to Australia’s north was populated by failing or 
unreliable states, about which Australian policy-makers need to be on their guard. 
Geography still mattered.55  Paradoxically enough, the selfsame Howard government 
that  had  come  to  office  vowing  to  eschew  the  “big  picture”  and  concentrate on 
domestic  affairs,  found  itself  involved  in  more  overseas  adventures  than  any 
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government since the Vietnam War. In one of the most remarkable transformations in 
Australia’s recent regional relations, the Howard government undertook major 
interventions in the Solomon Islands and East Timor, in addition to its commitments in 
Afghanistan and Iraq.56 
From the perspective of Australia’s evolving policy toward the “Asia-Pacific”, it 
was  striking  that  one  of  the  principal  sources  of  policy  advice  was  the  newly 
established Australian Strategic Policy Institute (ASPI). Established by the Howard 
government in 2001 as a source of independent strategic advice, ASPI has produced a 
stream of policy documents some of which, especially those on the troubled South 
Pacific Islands, have been especially influential. ASPI’s first director, Hugh White, 
became  a  prominent  commentator  on   Australia’s  strategic  relations,  and  was 
noteworthy for recognising that the nature of warfare and the sort of threats Australia 
faced had changed radically. White was also instrumental in drawing attention to the 
contradictions and complexities inherent in Australia’s relations with China, a 
relationship that looked set to become the defining Australian foreign policy issue of 
the early twenty-first century.57 Rather tellingly, both of these articles appeared in the 
pages of the Australian Journal of International Affairs, which continued to be the 
principal outlet for academic commentary on foreign affairs and strategic relations. 
Under the editorship of William Tow and latterly Michael Wesley, the Australian 
Journal  of  International  Affairs  has  quite  self-consciously  become  more  policy- 
oriented in the style of Foreign Affairs. 
American influences on Australian intellectual life extend beyond publishing styles, 
however. The inauguration of the Lowy Institute in 2003 marked the first US-style, 
privately funded think tank dedicated to “producing distinctive research and fresh 
policy options for Australia’s international policy”. Although the Institute has produced 
useful research and been largely free of the ideological baggage that invariably 
characterises its American counterparts, it is striking how small and interconnected 
Australia’s mainstream international policy-oriented community actually is. The 
institute’s  director,  Alan  Gyngell,  was  formerly  with  the  Office  of   National 
Assessment, as was Michael Wesley (the newly-appointed director in June 2009), and 
a number of ASPI’s key personnel. Hugh White and the now venerable Owen Harries 
are both visiting fellows at the Institute, while former fellow Alan Dupont moved on to 
take up the new Chair in International Security at the University of Sydney. Given the 
limited number of  scholars and commentators based in Australia —  or  the small 
number whose views are actually taken seriously by policy-makers and the media, at 
least — it is perhaps surprising that there is as much plurality of opinion as there is. 
True, broadly conceived security questions have assumed a renewed prominence in 
the aftermath of 9/11, but the way security is conceived and the possible cause of 
insecurity have become more sophisticated and broader even in the mainstream.58 
Indeed, one of the most striking, inadvertent consequences of US policy post-9/11 has 
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been to encourage a rather radical re-think about the benefits of close ties with the US 
in decidedly non-radical circles.59  This has obvious and major implications for 
Australia’s relations with Asia: if Australia does recalibrate and downgrade strategic 
ties with the US, this opens up the possibility, perhaps the necessity, of consolidating 
ties with its immediate region. As we have seen, there have always been voices in 
Australia urging this course of action and stressing the need for closer engagement with 
the region — often at the centre of government itself.60  To judge from the actions of 
Kevin Rudd since becoming prime minister, this impulse remains strong on the Labor 
side of politics, at least.61 
Whether closer ties with, let alone grand visions for, the region as a whole are 
realisable remains a moot point, but Australian policy-makers would seem to have little 
option other than to try. The seemingly irresistible rise of China ensures that relations 
with East Asia continue to determine Australian living standards and shape the regional 
and international geopolitical context in which Australian foreign policy is conducted. 
Given the potential importance of institutions in consolidating and mediating this 
process, it is surprising how ineffective Australia-sponsored efforts have been thus far, 
and how modest the analysis of such institutions has tended to be.62 If there is one area 
in which Australian scholars might have been expected to exploit their comparative 
advantage it is in explaining how countries cope with being something of an outlier in 
the region of which they are a part; or in Australia’s case, of which they would like to 
be a part. Somewhat surprisingly, however, little that is distinctive or different has 
emerged in institutional analysis in Australia;63 it is a field that remains dominated by 
North American scholarship,64 something that may be reflective of the wider set of 
hegemonic relations within which Australia’s foreign relations remain embedded. It 
remains an area in which Australian scholars may yet distinguish themselves. 
 
Concluding Remarks 
“Asia” has always mattered to “Australia”. Thankfully, our collective understanding of 
each end of that rather imprecise and all-encompassing dyad has improved steadily 
over time, even if our sense of quite what to do about it remains contested and at times 
uncertain. It  could  hardly  be  otherwise,  for  Australian  policy-makers and 
commentators come and go, and “Asia” is, of course, a complex place. More 
importantly for our purposes, understandings of Asia and Australia’s engagement with 
the region closely track domestic political debates and conflicts. This is why the Cold 
War battles over Asia came to be replaced in the 1980s and 1990s with a distinctive 
policy turn in academic studies that reflected the triumph of neoliberalism and the 
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waning  of  ideological  politics  of  the  1960s.  In  this  way  ,  the  study  of  Asian 
engagement becomes a mirror not just into our anxieties and vulnerabilities — a point 
that has been made in different ways by Walker, Burke and Dalrymple — but is also a 
reflection of the debates over the national and political identity of settler society that is 
both “in and out” of its immediate region. 
It is also significant that a small number of individuals, such as Eggleston, Ball, 
Arndt and Garnaut, have proved to be highly influential in developing and sustaining 
political and policy consensus in Asia . The success of these individuals in fashioning 
public debate and policy is due to their having moved easily and often between the 
worlds of academia and policy-making, aided by what Collins calls Australia’s 
Benthamite public culture65. However, the increasing complexity of policy issues and 
the professionalisation of the disciplines of economics and international relations make 
it unlikely that such dominant public intellectuals will emerge in the future. 
The more pressing question is this: have the ideas of Asian engagement now been 
exhausted? 
Even at the level of reified bilateral relations between states, there are a multitude of 
inter-connections and possibilities, some more alluring, important or productive than 
others. But there are other levels of “engagement”, too, which occur whenever 
Australians visit the region — something that Islamic militants have been quick to 
recognise when targeting holidaymakers in Bali. Whether mass tourism counts as the 
sort of Asia literacy the likes of Steven Fitzgerald hoped for is debateable, but travel 
and steadily rising levels of immigration from the region have probably done as much 
to make Australians feel “relaxed and comfortable” about their place in the region as 
any conventional inter-state initiative has. 
The  election  of   Australia’s  first  Mandarin-speaking  prime  minister  is  also 
emblematic of the changing order. True, Kevin Rudd is one of the strongest supporters 
of the alliance with the US in the Labor Party, but the fact that he is unambiguously 
Asia-literate can only be a positive as far as inter-state regional relations are concerned. 
Having said that, Rudd may come to be judged by his actions rather than his words, 
however dazzling his linguistic skills may be: the fact that Rudd has recently moved to 
increase significantly Australia’s defence spending in response to an “Asian arms race” 
suggests that the realists are still ascendant in Canberra when it comes to shaping 
regional relations.66 Depressingly enough, it seems that as far as at least some aspects 
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